Liability-based Incentives

Liability-Based Incentives is an economic instrument for pollution control that belongs to the class of incentive-based mechanisms, distinguished by imposing financial responsibility on polluters for actual or potential environmental damages, thereby internalizing external costs through retrospective accountability.

56

Publications

3.1K

Citations

75

Authors

64

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Variants

Liability-based Instruments

Authors

75

  1. SS
    Steven Shavell

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    5 publications · 1.6K citations

    5

    h-index

  2. MF
    Michaël Faure

    Maastricht University, Netherlands

    4 publications · 72 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. AE
    Alfred Endres

    FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany

    4 publications · 102 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. GD
    Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

    University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

    3 publications · 95 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. TF
    Tim Friehe

    Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Germany

    3 publications · 72 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 75

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 7 publications · 207 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Legal Studies

    JLS · 4 publications · 135 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    4 publications · 727 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. 2

    h-index

  5. American Economic Review

    2 publications · 39 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5