Liability-based Incentives
Liability-Based Incentives is an economic instrument for pollution control that belongs to the class of incentive-based mechanisms, distinguished by imposing financial responsibility on polluters for actual or potential environmental damages, thereby internalizing external costs through retrospective accountability.
56
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3.1K
Citations
75
Authors
64
Institutions
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2017–2026
0
Variants
Liability-based Instruments
56
Economic Analysis of Accident Law.
Roger Bowles, Steven Shavell · The Economic Journal · 1989 · 777 citations
Steven Shavell · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1982 · 258 citations
Business, Insurance, Risk Management +16
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
Yeon‐Koo Che · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1991 · 136 citations
Law, Tort Law, Contract Theory +6
Economic Theories of Legal Liability
Robert D. Cooter · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 1991 · 107 citations · Full text
Law, Contract Law, Tort Law +11
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64
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands
4 h-index
4 publications
72 citations
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
3 h-index
4 publications
63 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
77 citations
FernUniversität in Hagen
Hagen, Germany
3 h-index
3 publications
72 citations
University of Konstanz
Konstanz, Germany
3 h-index
3 publications
72 citations
Temple University
Philadelphia, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
102 citations
Tinbergen Institute
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
2 h-index
2 publications
28 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
189 citations
1–8 of 64
Repository · 7 publications · 207 citations
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JLS · 4 publications · 135 citations
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4 publications · 727 citations
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2 publications · 35 citations
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2 publications · 39 citations
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