Judicial Self-restraint

Judicial Self-Restraint is a principle of constitutional adjudication wherein a court limits its own power by deferring to legislative decisions, particularly in the review of statutes, on the grounds that elected bodies, rather than the judiciary, are constitutionally empowered to make policy choices.

34

Publications

1.7K

Citations

37

Authors

27

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

37

  1. PH
    Peter H. Russell

    Royal Veterinary College, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 51 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. RA
    Richard A. Posner

    University of Chicago, United States

    2 publications · 91 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. JE
    Jens Elo Rytter

    University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    1 publications · 53 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. HJ
    Harold J. Spaeth

    Michigan State University, United States

    1 publications · 51 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. JS
    J. Skelly Wright

    1 publications · 16 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 37

Venues

  1. American Political Science Review

    3 publications · 69 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 62 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. German Law Journal

    2 publications · 103 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Jurnal Konstitusi

    2 publications · 22 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. European Constitutional Law Review

    EuConst · 1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5