Hidden Information Models
Hidden Information Models is a theoretical framework in moral hazard assessment that belongs to the class of principal-agent models wherein the distinguishing feature is the presence of asymmetric information due to the agent's private knowledge of their type or characteristics prior to contract formation.
390
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24.6K
Citations
1.2K
Authors
502
Institutions
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2017–2026
170
Variants
Adverse Selection Models
Parents
390
Relational Incentive Contracts
Jonathan Levin · American Economic Review · 2003 · 1.1K citations
Bipartite network projection and personal recommendation
Tao Zhou, Jie Ren, Matúš Medo et al. · Physical Review E · 2007 · 1.1K citations · Full text
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Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Paris, France
10 h-index
36 publications
743 citations

Hunan University
Changsha, China
9 h-index
22 publications
366 citations
Université de Technologie de Troyes
Troyes, France
8 h-index
34 publications
867 citations
Tsinghua University
Beijing, China
7 h-index
18 publications
999 citations
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, United Kingdom
6 h-index
27 publications
4.5K citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
6 h-index
10 publications
385 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
6 h-index
6 publications
1.4K citations

Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Shanghai, China
6 h-index
20 publications
468 citations
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Repository · 13 publications · 858 citations
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