Game-Theoretic Voting is a formal framework within voting theory that models strategic voter behavior as rational decision-making in a game-theoretic setting, where voters' choices are determined by strategic interactions and expected utility maximization under explicit assumptions about preference profiles and voting rules.
217
Publications
19.3K
Citations
343
Authors
202
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
21
Parents
Publications
217
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Allan Gibbard · Econometrica · 1973 · 3.3K citations
A strategic calculus of voting
Thomas R. Palfrey, Howard L. Rosenthal · Public Choice · 1983 · 468 citations
1–5 of 217
Authors
343
- TR
6
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- HL
4
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- TF
4
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- BP
4
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- SJ
4
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1–5 of 343
Institutions
202
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
8 h-index
11 publications
2.6K citations
New York University
New York, United States
8 h-index
10 publications
798 citations
Université de Montréal
Montreal, Canada
7 h-index
9 publications
654 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
6 h-index
7 publications
4.5K citations
University of Rochester
Rochester, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
642 citations
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
139 citations
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, United States
5 h-index
8 publications
1.1K citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
5 h-index
9 publications
326 citations
1–8 of 202
Venues
- Public Choice
16 publications · 966 citations
11
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- Econometrica
10 publications · 4K citations
10
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- Social Choice and Welfare
11 publications · 561 citations
10
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 9 publications · 3.6K citations
9
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- Games and Economic Behavior
9 publications · 430 citations
9
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1–5