First-best Contracts
First-Best Contracts is a theoretical contract design in principal-agent economics that belongs to the class of optimal incentive contracts and is distinguished by achieving socially efficient outcomes under full information, thereby serving as a benchmark for evaluating welfare losses due to hidden action.
79
Publications
7.5K
Citations
127
Authors
95
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
8
Parents
79
Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
George P. Baker · Journal of Political Economy · 1992 · 1.1K citations
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
William P. Rogerson · Econometrica · 1985 · 885 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +17
Competition for Agency Contracts
R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1987 · 257 citations
1–5 of 79
127
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Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong SAR China
2 publications · 194 citations
2
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2
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1–5 of 127
95

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
4 h-index
4 publications
212 citations

The University of Sydney
Sydney, Australia
3 h-index
3 publications
148 citations
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
3 h-index
3 publications
155 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
296 citations

University of Hong Kong
Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
3 h-index
3 publications
202 citations

University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada
2 h-index
3 publications
298 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
170 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
193 citations
1–8 of 95
7 publications · 739 citations
7
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Repository · 7 publications · 336 citations
7
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6 publications · 885 citations
6
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JEMS · 5 publications · 322 citations
5
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Repository · 4 publications · 152 citations
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1–5