First-best Contracts

First-Best Contracts is a theoretical contract design in principal-agent economics that belongs to the class of optimal incentive contracts and is distinguished by achieving socially efficient outcomes under full information, thereby serving as a benchmark for evaluating welfare losses due to hidden action.

79

Publications

7.5K

Citations

127

Authors

95

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

8

Authors

127

  1. SH
    Sameer Hasija

    INSEAD, Singapore

    3 publications · 199 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. DT
    David Thesmar

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    2 publications · 174 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. AL
    Augustin Landier

    HEC Paris, France

    2 publications · 174 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SK
    Son Ku Kim

    Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong SAR China

    2 publications · 194 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. LY
    Leon Yang Chu

    University of Southern California, United States

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 127

Venues

  1. The RAND Journal of Economics

    7 publications · 739 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 7 publications · 336 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. The Review of Economic Studies

    6 publications · 885 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 5 publications · 322 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 4 publications · 152 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5