Executive Turnover Incentives

Executive Turnover Incentives is a strategic compensation mechanism within deferred compensation systems that specifically ties post-employment benefits to executive retention and departure timelines, thereby distinguishing itself from general incentive plans through its focus on managing leadership transitions and minimizing destabilizing turnover.

21

Publications

1.4K

Citations

46

Authors

51

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

46

  1. RR
    Roberta Romano

    Yale University, United States

    2 publications · 82 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. CM
    Camelia M. Kuhnen

    Northwestern University, United States

    2 publications · 470 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. AL
    Andrea L. Eisfeldt

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    2 publications · 470 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SB
    Sanjai Bhagat

    University of Colorado Boulder, United States

    2 publications · 82 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JW
    John W. Boudreau

    Cornell University, United States

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 46

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 185 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Finance

    2 publications · 146 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 1 publications · 339 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. European Company and Financial Law Review

    1 publications · 46 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Management & Governance

    1 publications · 155 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5