Executive Pay Restraint

Executive Pay Restraint is a governance construct in corporate finance that refers to the deliberate limitation of executive compensation levels and structures through institutional oversight, shareholder voting, or regulatory mechanisms to align managerial incentives with long-term shareholder value and mitigate excessive risk-taking.

49

Publications

1.9K

Citations

97

Authors

94

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

13

Authors

97

  1. KJ
    Kevin J. Murphy

    University of Southern California, United States

    3 publications · 156 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. KW
    Kenneth W. Shaw

    University of Missouri, United States

    2 publications · 178 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. AR
    Alon Raviv

    Bar-Ilan University, Israel

    2 publications · 23 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JH
    Jarrad Harford

    University of Washington, United States

    2 publications · 78 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. DI
    David I. Walker

    Boston University, United States

    2 publications · 30 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 97

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 11 publications · 261 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. The Accounting Review

    3 publications · 215 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Journal of Corporate Finance

    2 publications · 77 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal

    2 publications · 120 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Journal of Business Finance &amp Accounting

    2 publications · 109 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5