Ex Post Incentives

Ex Post Incentives is a whistleblower incentive mechanism that belongs to the class of reward-based institutional designs and is specifically characterized by the provision of compensation or benefits only after the verification and substantive impact of the disclosed information have been established.

38

Publications

2.4K

Citations

62

Authors

65

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Variants

Ex-post Incentives

Authors

62

  1. VI
    Vasso Ioannidou

    Centre for Economic Policy Research, United Kingdom

    3 publications · 277 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. AN
    Allen N. Berger

    University of South Carolina, United States

    3 publications · 277 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. WS
    W. Scott Frame

    Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, United States

    2 publications · 262 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. PC
    Pierre Chaigneau

    HEC Montréal, Canada

    2 publications · 228 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. AD
    Adolfo de Motta

    McGill University, Canada

    2 publications · 228 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 62

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 216 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Finance

    3 publications · 291 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 58 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Regulation & Governance

    1 publications · 32 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. The Journal of Law Economics and Organization

    LEO · 1 publications · 18 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5