Equilibrium Relational Contracting

Equilibrium Relational Contracting is a theoretical framework within relational contract theory that models long-term contractual relationships as dynamic strategic interactions, distinguished by its emphasis on self-enforcing agreements sustained through equilibrium incentives in repeated gameplay between parties.

102

Publications

5.7K

Citations

151

Authors

121

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

15

Authors

151

  1. OK
    Ola Kvaløy

    University of Stavanger, Norway

    8 publications · 394 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. TE
    Trond E. Olsen

    Norwegian School of Economics, Norway

    7 publications · 277 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. MB
    Martin Brown

    University of St.Gallen, Switzerland

    4 publications · 654 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. AF
    Armin Falk

    University of Bonn, Germany

    4 publications · 654 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    4 publications · 654 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 151

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 10 publications · 328 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. Econometrica

    4 publications · 641 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Management Science

    3 publications · 139 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 3 publications · 116 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Labor Economics

    JOLE · 3 publications · 236 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5