Equilibrium Relational Contracting
Equilibrium Relational Contracting is a theoretical framework within relational contract theory that models long-term contractual relationships as dynamic strategic interactions, distinguished by its emphasis on self-enforcing agreements sustained through equilibrium incentives in repeated gameplay between parties.
102
Publications
5.7K
Citations
151
Authors
121
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
15
Parents
102
Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
Martin Brown, Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr · Econometrica · 2004 · 475 citations
Trust and Adaptation in Relational Contracting
Frank L. Jeffries, Richard Reed · Academy of Management Review · 2000 · 326 citations
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151
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121
University of Stavanger
Stavanger, Norway
8 h-index
8 publications
394 citations
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Norway
7 h-index
7 publications
277 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
588 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
91 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
159 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
4 h-index
4 publications
69 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
172 citations
University of Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
4 h-index
6 publications
1.6K citations
1–8 of 121
Repository · 10 publications · 328 citations
10
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4 publications · 641 citations
4
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3 publications · 139 citations
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JEMS · 3 publications · 116 citations
3
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JOLE · 3 publications · 236 citations
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