Entry Deterrence Through Collusion
Entry Deterrence Through Collusion is a strategic framework in auction theory whereby incumbent bidders engage in collusive practices to systematically elevate entry barriers for potential competitors, thereby preserving market insularity and maintaining supra-competitive bidding advantages.
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669
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Institutions
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2017–2026
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Robert Clark, Decio Coviello, Jean-Franï¿ ⁄ ois Gauthier et al. · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 2018 · 56 citations · Full text
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Queen's University
Kingston, Canada
2 h-index
2 publications
83 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
39 citations

Paris School of Economics
Paris, France
1 h-index
1 publications
18 citations

University of Auckland
Auckland, New Zealand
1 h-index
3 publications
54 citations
Boston College
Boston, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
56 citations

University of Leicester
Leicester, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
27 citations

Tulane University
New Orleans, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
66 citations
Protected Trust Services (United Kingdom)
Dorchester, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
25 citations
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3 publications · 103 citations
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Repository · 2 publications · 41 citations
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1 publications · 27 citations
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JPE · 1 publications · 31 citations
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