Entry Deterrence Through Collusion

Entry Deterrence Through Collusion is a strategic framework in auction theory whereby incumbent bidders engage in collusive practices to systematically elevate entry barriers for potential competitors, thereby preserving market insularity and maintaining supra-competitive bidding advantages.

21

Publications

669

Citations

33

Authors

30

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

33

  1. JS
    Jaideep Shenoy

    University of Connecticut, United States

    2 publications · 93 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. RH
    Richard Harris

    Queen's University, Canada

    1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. GN
    George Norman

    Tufts University, United States

    1 publications · 27 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. DC
    Decio Coviello

    HEC Montréal, Canada

    1 publications · 56 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. WM
    William MacLeod

    Boston University, United States

    1 publications · 27 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 33

Venues

  1. 3

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 41 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. European Economic Review

    2 publications · 28 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. The Economic Journal

    1 publications · 27 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Political Economy

    JPE · 1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5