Efficiency Under Common Values

Efficiency Under Common Values is a theoretical framework in auction theory that specifies the conditions under which an auction mechanism maximizes allocative efficiency when bidders share interdependent valuations and information is asymmetrically distributed among them.

31

Publications

1.6K

Citations

54

Authors

44

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

54

  1. AM
    Alejandro M. Manelli

    Arizona State University, United States

    2 publications · 46 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. LD
    Lieven De Moor

    Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

    2 publications · 47 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. MS
    Martín Sefton

    University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 46 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JK
    Jacob K. Goeree

    University of Virginia, United States

    2 publications · 174 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. FV
    Filip Van den Bossche

    Hasselt University, Belgium

    2 publications · 47 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 54

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 53 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 4 publications · 202 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. European Economic Review

    3 publications · 398 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Journal of the Operational Research Society

    OR · 1 publications · 262 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. 1

    h-index

1–5