Efficiency Under Common Values
Efficiency Under Common Values is a theoretical framework in auction theory that specifies the conditions under which an auction mechanism maximizes allocative efficiency when bidders share interdependent valuations and information is asymmetrically distributed among them.
31
Publications
1.6K
Citations
54
Authors
44
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
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University of Nottingham
Nottingham, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
46 citations
Arizona State University
Tempe, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
46 citations
University of Southampton
Southampton, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
55 citations

University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 h-index
4 publications
348 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
371 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
3 publications
44 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
41 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
134 citations
1–8 of 44
Repository · 4 publications · 53 citations
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JET · 4 publications · 202 citations
4
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3 publications · 398 citations
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OR · 1 publications · 262 citations
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1 publications · 36 citations
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