Crisis Instability

Crisis Instability is a strategic condition in nuclear deterrence theory wherein the outbreak of hostilities creates strong incentives for rapid escalation to nuclear weapon use due to fears of preemptive strikes or first-strike advantages, thereby increasing the likelihood of nuclear war during periods of political or military crisis.

50

Publications

2.2K

Citations

83

Authors

48

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Authors

83

  1. RP
    Robert Powell

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    3 publications · 222 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. BG
    Bruce G. Blair

    University of New Brunswick, Canada

    2 publications · 57 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. KG
    Kurt Gottfried

    Cornell University, United States

    2 publications · 57 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MW
    Mohammad Wasseem

    2 publications · 24 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. VN
    Vipin Narang

    Singapore Immunology Network, Singapore

    2 publications · 163 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 83

Venues

  1. International Security

    6 publications · 616 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. Choice Reviews Online

    CRO · 4 publications · 118 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Journal of Conflict Resolution

    3 publications · 207 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. American Political Science Review

    3 publications · 180 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Asian Survey

    3 publications · 37 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5