Contractual Frictions

Contractual Frictions is a theoretical construct within the domain of switching costs that denotes the extent to which formal agreements, enforceable obligations, or legal stipulations impede a party’s ability to transition to alternative providers or terminate existing relationships.

63

Publications

4.1K

Citations

105

Authors

95

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

16

Authors

105

  1. PW
    Paul Willen

    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, United States

    5 publications · 233 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. KG
    Kristopher Gerardi

    Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, United States

    5 publications · 233 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. PA
    Pol Antràs

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    5 publications · 531 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. LG
    Lorenz Göette

    University of Lausanne, Switzerland

    4 publications · 223 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. CL
    Christopher L. Foote

    Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, United States

    4 publications · 223 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 105

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 15 publications · 425 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. Econometrica

    4 publications · 329 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 57 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. National Bureau of Economic Research

    Repository · 3 publications · 163 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Political Economy

    JPE · 2 publications · 335 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5