Contracting Efficiency

Contracting Efficiency is a theoretical construct in corporate governance that measures the extent to which executive employment contracts, particularly those involving golden parachutes, minimize agency costs and informational asymmetries while aligning executive incentives with shareholder value maximization.

171

Publications

11.5K

Citations

316

Authors

204

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

21

Authors

316

  1. SR
    Shivaram Rajgopal

    Columbia University, United States

    4 publications · 380 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. AJ
    Andrew J. Oswald

    University of Warwick, United Kingdom

    3 publications · 321 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. DI
    David I. Walker

    Boston University, United States

    3 publications · 67 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. VV
    Valeri V. Nikolaev

    University of Chicago, United States

    2 publications · 429 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. JL
    John L. Campbell

    University of Georgia, United States

    2 publications · 73 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 316

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 26 publications · 1K citations

    17

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 5 publications · 290 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Industrial Marketing Management

    3 publications · 139 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Public Administration Review

    PAR · 3 publications · 690 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Comparative Economics

    3 publications · 114 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5