Contracting Efficiency
Contracting Efficiency is a theoretical construct in corporate governance that measures the extent to which executive employment contracts, particularly those involving golden parachutes, minimize agency costs and informational asymmetries while aligning executive incentives with shareholder value maximization.
171
Publications
11.5K
Citations
316
Authors
204
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
21
Parents
171
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman · Review of Financial Studies · 2007 · 466 citations
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204
Columbia University
New York, United States
6 h-index
6 publications
478 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
4 h-index
4 publications
451 citations
Boston University
Boston, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
136 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
4 h-index
6 publications
1.1K citations
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
359 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
128 citations

University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
228 citations
European Corporate Governance Institute
Brussels, Belgium
3 h-index
3 publications
56 citations
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Repository · 26 publications · 1K citations
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Repository · 5 publications · 290 citations
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3 publications · 139 citations
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PAR · 3 publications · 690 citations
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3 publications · 114 citations
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