Collusive Punishments

Collusive Punishments is a theoretical construct in auction economics that specifies the mechanisms or strategies employed by colluding bidders to enforce compliance with tacit or explicit agreements through penalties imposed on deviations from coordinated bidding behavior.

28

Publications

1.9K

Citations

34

Authors

30

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

34

  1. DJ
    David J. Cooper

    Florida State University, United States

    3 publications · 229 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. MP
    Maarten Pieter Schinkel

    University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

    3 publications · 50 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. KK
    Kai‐Uwe Kühn

    University of Bonn, Germany

    3 publications · 229 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. SC
    Sylvain Chassang

    Princeton University, United States

    2 publications · 89 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. AS
    Andrzej Skrzypacz

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 96 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 34

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 191 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. Journal of Industrial Economics

    2 publications · 140 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. 2

    h-index

  4. International Economic Review

    2 publications · 76 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. American Law and Economics Review

    1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5