Collusive Punishments
Collusive Punishments is a theoretical construct in auction economics that specifies the mechanisms or strategies employed by colluding bidders to enforce compliance with tacit or explicit agreements through penalties imposed on deviations from coordinated bidding behavior.
28
Publications
1.9K
Citations
34
Authors
30
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Parents
28
Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
Fred Kofman, Jacques Lawarrée · Econometrica · 1993 · 410 citations
Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell, Chris William Sanchirico · The Review of Economic Studies · 2004 · 384 citations
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30
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
527 citations

University of East Anglia
Norwich, United Kingdom
3 h-index
4 publications
239 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
86 citations

Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
96 citations
Florida State University
Tallahassee, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
296 citations
New York University
New York, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
89 citations
Central University of Finance and Economics
Beijing, China
1 h-index
1 publications
37 citations
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
76 citations
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Repository · 6 publications · 191 citations
7
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2 publications · 140 citations
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2 publications · 50 citations
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2 publications · 76 citations
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1 publications · 31 citations
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