Coalition Payoffs
Coalition Payoffs is a theoretical construct in political science that specifies the distribution of policy benefits, patronage, or governmental influence among participating parties in a coalition government, differentiated by its function in modeling incentive structures that sustain inter-party agreements.
121
Publications
8.2K
Citations
223
Authors
162
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
15
Parents
121
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
Debraj Ray, Rajiv Vohra · Journal of Economic Theory · 1997 · 437 citations · Full text
1–5 of 121
223
5
h-index
4
h-index
4
h-index
4
h-index
3
h-index
1–5 of 223
162
Brown University
Providence, United States
6 h-index
7 publications
1.4K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
5 h-index
16 publications
699 citations
Leiden University
Leiden, The Netherlands
4 h-index
9 publications
283 citations

University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
Milwaukee, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
752 citations
University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany
3 h-index
4 publications
718 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
3 h-index
3 publications
93 citations
RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
46 citations
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, Canada
3 h-index
3 publications
612 citations
1–8 of 162
Repository · 7 publications · 195 citations
7
h-index
JET · 5 publications · 815 citations
5
h-index
5 publications · 552 citations
5
h-index
4 publications · 96 citations
4
h-index
TON · 3 publications · 102 citations
3
h-index
1–5