Bargaining Set

The Bargaining Set is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that identifies the set of feasible payoff allocations where no coalition can object to an allocation with a justified threat, given that every objection can be countered by another coalition defending the allocation.

74

Publications

6.1K

Citations

90

Authors

59

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

90

  1. MM
    Michael Maschler

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    9 publications · 1.4K citations

    9

    h-index

  2. BP
    Bezalel Peleg

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    6 publications · 668 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. JL
    Jiuqiang Liu

    Eastern Michigan University, United States

    3 publications · 38 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. RV
    Rajiv Vohra

    Brown University, United States

    3 publications · 159 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. JW
    John Whalley

    Western University, Canada

    2 publications · 25 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 90

Venues

  1. International Journal of Game Theory

    13 publications · 478 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. Journal of Mathematical Economics

    6 publications · 297 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    6 publications · 253 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 4 publications · 233 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics

    3 publications · 2.1K citations

    3

    h-index

1–5