Bargaining Set
The Bargaining Set is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that identifies the set of feasible payoff allocations where no coalition can object to an allocation with a justified threat, given that every objection can be countered by another coalition defending the allocation.
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6.1K
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2017–2026
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The kernel of a cooperative game
Morton D. Davis, Michael Maschler · Naval Research Logistics Quarterly · 1965 · 734 citations
An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
Andreu Mas‐Colell · Journal of Mathematical Economics · 1989 · 204 citations · Full text
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Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
11 h-index
13 publications
1.5K citations
Brown University
Providence, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
207 citations
Eastern Michigan University
Ypsilanti, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
38 citations
Xi'an University of Finance and Economics
Xi'an, China
3 h-index
4 publications
55 citations

Western University
London, Canada
3 h-index
3 publications
121 citations
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Beersheba, Israel
3 h-index
4 publications
61 citations

Universitat de Miguel Hernández d'Elx
Elche, Spain
2 h-index
2 publications
40 citations
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
Haifa, Israel
2 h-index
3 publications
61 citations
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13 publications · 478 citations
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6 publications · 297 citations
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6 publications · 253 citations
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JET · 4 publications · 233 citations
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3 publications · 2.1K citations
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