Antitrust Leniency

Antitrust Leniency is a legal and economic policy mechanism within competition law enforcement whereby a governmental authority grants reduced penalties or immunity to a firm or individual that voluntarily discloses participation in anticompetitive collusion, thereby distinguishing it from standard punitive approaches by incentivizing whistleblowing to facilitate the detection and prosecution of cartels.

70

Publications

3.1K

Citations

77

Authors

60

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Variants

Corporate Leniency ProgramLeniency Program

Authors

77

  1. GS
    Giancarlo Spagnolo

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    12 publications · 695 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. CM
    Catarina Marvão

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    4 publications · 73 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. JE
    Joseph E. Harrington

    Johns Hopkins University, United States

    4 publications · 372 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. SF
    Sven‐Olof Fridolfsson

    Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden

    3 publications · 225 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. JH
    Jeroen Hinloopen

    University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

    3 publications · 211 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 77

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 17 publications · 634 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    4 publications · 426 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Journal of Industrial Economics

    3 publications · 340 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Journal of Competition Law & Economics

    JCLE · 3 publications · 149 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. World Competition

    3 publications · 54 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5