The Proliferation Security Initiative: interdicting vessels in international waters to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction?

Douglas Guilfoyle

UCL Discovery (University College London) · 2005 · 44 citations · 0 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The legality of stopping and searching vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction in international waters is uncertain, as high‑seas interdictions are generally limited to flag‑state consent or narrow circumstances. The article seeks to demonstrate that, under the War on Terror, belligerent contraband law permits high‑seas interdiction of weapons shipments bound for non‑state actors such as al‑Qa’eda. The Proliferation Security Initiative, a US‑led coalition, employs measures grounded in heads‑of‑state jurisdiction to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The authors conclude that belligerent contraband law permits high‑seas interdiction of weapons shipments destined for non‑state actors.

Abstract

[Can a state stop and search vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction in international waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led coalition, aims to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction through a variety of measures based on uncontroversial heads of state jurisdiction. But when might high seas interdictions be lawful, if suspect vessels do not pass through territory within the Proliferation Security Initiative’s reach? Ordinarily, merchant vessels in international waters can only be stopped and searched without flag state consent in very limited circumstances. This article, however, argues that insofar as the ‘War on Terror’ is a conflict with ascertained non-state actors, the law of belligerent contraband could allow high seas interdiction of weapons shipments bound for organisations such as al-Qa’eda.]