Causal Judgments and Causal Explanations

Abstract

Consider following two instances of lighting of a match: first, a matche is struck in railroad smoking car, and match lights. Second, a match, having been pulled from assembly line in match factory, is struck in a supposedly evacuated chamber, purpose being to test hardness of match head. But chamber has not been properly sealed, and match lights. In first case, it seems correct to say that cause of lighting of match was striking of match. In second case, however, cause can reasonably said to be presence of oxygen, and not striking. Rather, we say that this striking is a condition of lighting, and not cause whereas in first case presence of oxygen is a condition, and striking is cause. John S. Mill opposed such talk, arguing that the real cause is whole of these antecedents and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give name of cause to one of them exclusively of others. Indeed, Mill went on to assert that nothing can better show absence of any scientific ground for distinction between causes of a phenomenon and its conditions than capricious manner in which we select from among conditions, than we choose to denominate clause. Although many writers, and particularly logical empiricists, have voiced no opposition to Mill's view, even within context of discussion of causal judgment and causal explanation, this tradition is by no means unchallenged. Ducasse, for example, addressed himself to Mill's denial of justifiability of distinction between causes and conditions and attempted to provide a principle on basis of which distinction could be defended.... Language: en