Robot (Artificial Intelligence System) as a Subject (Quasi-Subject) of Law

Abstract

The paper analyzes the possibility and expediency of recognizing robots and artificial intelligence systems as subjects or quasi-subjects of law. The author states that there are three approaches to understanding the subject matter: 1) the formal legal (positivist) approach; 2) the anthropocentric approach; and 3) the naturalistic approach Only within the framework of the latter, attempts are made to identify objectively existing features of the subject of law. At the same time, unlike a quasi-subject, the subject of law always has such a feature as freedom of will. The solution to the question of whether a robot (an artificial intelligence system) has its own will depends on understanding the concept of «will» itself, which is also far from unambiguous. The author identifies two main approaches to the concept of will: 1) the will as a manifestation of self-consciousness; 2) the will as the ability to achieve a goal. Modern robots (artificial intelligence systems) do not have self-awareness, therefore, within the framework of this approach, giving them the status of a legal entity is possible only in an indefinite perspective. The second approach to understanding the will can be applied to many already existing systems. Thus, the author states that the potential for subjectivity of robots (artificial intelligence systems) exists. However, the advantages of such a solution are not obvious in comparison with their consideration as quasi-subjects of law. In this regard, it is justified that the introduction into the legal sphere of such a fundamentally new subject of law as a robot (an artificial intelligence system) is premature. However, there is an objective need to recognize a number of them as quasi-legal entities that represent a certain legal value.