Corporate Environmental Governance Strategies Under the Dual Supervision of the Government and the Public

Abstract

External regulatory and normative pressures from both the Chinese central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) program and public participation can act together to influence corporate environmental governance behavior. This research uses the multiperiod Difference-In-Differences method to test the compound impact of CEPI and public participation on corporate environmental governance strategies and investigate the underlying influence mechanisms. The results show that CEPI and public participation have a positive compound effect on the corporate “source-control” strategy. A reasonable reduction in pollution charges and increased environmental subsidies are essential to stimulate the green innovation potential of heavily polluting firms. Our research helps clarify the game relationship between the central and the local governments and analyzes how the relationship between the government, the public, and corporates affects environmental governance, thereby advancing principal-agent theory and expanding the current research on institutional pressures and corporate environmental governance.