Management Science · 2017 · 143 citations · 29 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsBehavioral EconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheoryAsymmetric InformationExploration-exploitation TradeoffIncentive SchemesInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsInformation RevelationConsumer Surplus AnalysisInformation Provision EffectsLarge-scale Linear ProgrammingMulti-armed Bandit OptimizationObfuscationRational AgentsStrategic Information Revelation
The study investigates how online platforms can optimally disclose information to maximize aggregate consumer surplus. The authors model the platform as a decentralized multi‑armed bandit, committing to a dynamic disclosure policy, and propose a heuristic that exploits information obfuscation to improve learning. They find that more accurate information can reduce consumer surplus because of insufficient exploration, and that strategically obfuscating past outcomes—solvable via a large‑scale linear program—improves surplus even when monetary incentives are available. Accepted by Serguei Netessine, Operations Management.
Motivated by the proliferation of online platforms that collect and disseminate consumers’ experiences with alternative substitutable products/services, we investigate the problem of optimal information provision when the goal is to maximize aggregate consumer surplus. We develop a decentralized multiarmed bandit framework where a forward-looking principal (the platform designer) commits up front to a policy that dynamically discloses information regarding the history of outcomes to a series of short-lived rational agents (the consumers). We demonstrate that consumer surplus is nonmonotone in the accuracy of the designer’s information-provision policy. Because consumers are constantly in “exploitation” mode, policies that disclose accurate information on past outcomes suffer from inadequate “exploration.” We illustrate how the designer can (partially) alleviate this inefficiency by employing a policy that strategically obfuscates the information in the platform’s possession; interestingly, such a policy is beneficial despite the fact that consumers are aware of both the designer’s objective and the precise way by which information is being disclosed to them. More generally, we show that the optimal information-provision policy can be obtained as the solution of a large-scale linear program. Noting that such a solution is typically intractable, we use our structural findings to design an intuitive heuristic that underscores the value of information obfuscation in decentralized learning. We further highlight that obfuscation remains beneficial even if the designer can directly incentivize consumers to explore through monetary payments. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
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A Simple Model of Herd Behavior
Abhijit Banerjee · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1992 · 6.6K citations
Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations