Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions?

June P. Tangney, Rowland S. Miller, Laura Flicker, Deborah Hill Barlow

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · 1996 · 1.2K citations · 0 references

Concepts

TL;DR

182 undergraduates described and rated personal embarrassment, shame, and guilt experiences on structural and phenomenological dimensions. The study found that shame, guilt, and embarrassment are distinct emotions, occurring in similar social contexts but also alone, with differences not attributable to intensity or moral transgression, and that participants judged themselves more harshly than others.

Abstract

182 undergraduates described personal embarrassment, shame, and guilt experiences and rated these experiences on structural and phenomenological dimensions. Contrary to popular belief, shame was no more likely than guilt to be experienced in "public" situations; all 3 emotions typically occurred in social contexts, but a significant proportion of shame and guilt events occurred when respondents were alone. Analyses of participants' phenomenological ratings clearly demonstrated that shame, guilt, and embarrassment are not merely different terms for the same affective experience. In particular, embarrassment was a relatively distant neighbor of shame and guilt, and the differences among the 3 could not be explained simply by intensity of affect or by degree of moral transgression. Finally, participants generally were their own harshest critics in each type of event, evaluating themselves more negatively than they believed others did.