LEAP

TLDR

Sensor networks require different security levels for various message types, so a single keying mechanism is inadequate. This paper introduces LEAP, a key‑management protocol that supports in‑network processing while confining the security impact of a compromised node to its immediate neighborhood. LEAP establishes four key types—individual, pairwise, cluster, and group—using a communication‑ and energy‑efficient protocol that minimizes base‑station involvement, and authenticates inter‑node traffic with one‑way key chains to enable source authentication without hindering in‑network processing. Analysis demonstrates that LEAP efficiently defends against a range of attacks, confirming its effectiveness in securing sensor networks.

Abstract

In this paper, we describe LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node -- an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network. The protocol used for establishing and updating these keys is communication- and energy-efficient, and minimizes the involvement of the base station. LEAP also includes an efficient protocol for inter-node traffic authentication based on the use of one-way key chains. A salient feature of the authentication protocol is that it supports source authentication without precluding in-network processing and passive participation. We analyze the performance and the security of our scheme under various attack models and show our schemes are very efficient in defending against many attacks.