2002 · 10 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesAutonomous SystemsDistributed SystemsGame TheoryIncentive SchemesInformation AsymmetryMulti-agent SystemsNash EquilibriumReputationReputation ManagementReputation MechanismsReputation ModelingReputation Systems
Reputation has attracted attention across disciplines such as distributed AI, economics, and evolutionary biology, yet most studies offer intuitive definitions without clarifying how they differ. This paper contends that reputation is not a single concept but comprises multiple distinct notions. After surveying existing literature, the authors propose an intuitive typology and introduce a simple evolutionary game‑theory simulation framework to assess the relative strength of these notions. The simulation enables quantitative comparison of the different reputation notions, a capability that was previously limited to qualitative analysis.
Reputation has recently received considerable attention within a number of disciplines such as distributed artificial intelligence, economics, evolutionary biology, among others. Most papers about reputation provide an intuitive approach to reputation which appeals to common experiences without clarifying whether their use of reputation is similar or different from those used by others. This paper argues that reputation is not a single notion but one with multiple parts. After a survey of existing works on reputation, an intuitive typology is proposed summarizing existing works on reputation across diverse disciplines. This paper then describes a simple simulation framework based on evolutionary game theory for understanding the relative strength of the different notions of reputation. Whereas these notions of reputation could only be compared qualitatively before, our simulation framework has enabled us to compare them quantitatively.