Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · 2008 · 90 citations · 12 references
Social SciencesNeurosciencePsychologyCognitive NeuroscienceCognitive PsychologyExperimental PsychologyExplanationTheory Of MindExplainabilityExplanation PreferencesNature Of Scientific ExplanationsPublic Interest AnalysisSalient Information SelectionSubjects
Neuroscience details in explanations of psychological phenomena attract more public interest but can also distract from critical evaluation of the explanation's logic. The study employed a 2×2 design presenting naïve adults, neuroscience students, and experts with psychological phenomena and either good or bad explanations, with or without irrelevant neuroscience information. All participants preferred good over bad explanations, yet nonexperts rated explanations containing irrelevant neuroscience as more satisfying—especially for bad explanations—thereby masking their flaws.
Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific information. Even irrelevant neuroscience information in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people's abilities to critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. We tested this hypothesis by giving naïve adults, students in a neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts brief descriptions of psychological phenomena followed by one of four types of explanation, according to a 2 (good explanation vs. bad explanation) x 2 (without neuroscience vs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the logic of the explanation, as confirmed by the expert subjects. Subjects in all three groups judged good explanations as more satisfying than bad ones. But subjects in the two nonexpert groups additionally judged that explanations with logically irrelevant neuroscience information were more satisfying than explanations without. The neuroscience information had a particularly striking effect on nonexperts' judgments of bad explanations, masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations.
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