Resilient Distributed Control Against Destabilization Attacks in DC Microgrids

Abstract

The distributed control provides a flexible and scalable solution to coordinate voltages and currents in DC microgrids but introduces intrusion risk into the system. Destabilization attacks can manipulate system states by modifying the transferred data, which threatens the stable operation of DC microgrids. In this paper, a resilient distributed control consisting of an integrated distributed control and an additional state limitation strategy is proposed to cope with destabilization attacks. The current-sharing regulation is integrated into the average voltage regulation in the integrated distributed control. A steady-state analysis is conducted to verify the superior performance of the integrated distributed control against destabilization attacks. As a supplement, state limitation strategies aim to actively restrict magnitudes of system states. Inspired by results in the attack analysis, virtual attacks are constructed to limit the voltages and currents within tolerant ranges. Several cases, including the simulation and the experiment, are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed resilient distributed control.