Philosophical Explorations · 2022 · 10 citations · 14 references
Social SciencesPhilosophyPsychologyMoral PsychologyPhilosophy Of ActionPrejudiceMoral AgencyMoral CognitionMoral Decision-makingMoral JudgmentMoral ReasoningMoral ResponsibilityBlame JudgmentMoral BeliefsMoral Responsibility JudgmentsMoral Responsibility PerceptionMoral WillMoral-epistemic Responsibility RelationshipPerception Of ResponsibilityWeakness Of Will
Difficulty is often treated as blame-mitigating, and even exculpating. But on some occasions difficulty seems to have little or no bearing on our assessments of moral responsibility, and can even exacerbate it. In this paper, I argue that the relevance (and irrelevance) of difficulty with regard to assessments of moral responsibility is best understood via Quality of Will accounts. I look at various ways of characterising difficulty – including via sacrifice, effort, skill and ‘trying’ – and set out to demonstrate that these factors are only blame-mitigating where, and to the extent that, they complicate ascriptions of insufficient concern. Matters become more complex, however, when we turn to difficult circumstances that seem to generate such objectionable attitudes. This is arguably the case with epistemic difficulty and certain instances of moral ignorance. Here I argue that certain difficult circumstances diminish the sense in which false moral beliefs are genuinely revelatory of the agents who hold them. In particular, I draw on the distinction between difficulty that generates objectionable attitudes, and objectionable attitudes that generate difficulty. I argue that the former, but not the latter, can plausibly be viewed as blame mitigating, and that this would apply to (limited) cases of moral ignorance.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Lena Wahlberg · Lund University Publications (Lund University) · 2017 · 1.8K citations
Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life
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Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency
Choice Reviews Online · 2004 · 779 citations
Humanities, Philosophy, Psychology +12
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