A European Solution for a European Crisis. The International implications of Portugal’s Revolution

Abstract

This article deals with the European dimension of the Portuguese crisis of 1974-75. The outcome of the crisis was impossible to predict and the risks of either an extreme radicalization of the post-revolutionary transition or of a neo-authoritarian reaction to it could not be discounted. The United States and its main European allies reacted differently to the Portuguese revolution of April 1974 and to what ensued. The latter dreaded a possible replica of the Chilean coup in Portugal and actively worked to prevent it; Washington instead feared a shift to the Left that could induce Portugal to abandon the Atlantic alliance and move closer to the Soviet bloc, and did not rule out the possibility of supporting an authoritarian response. Many Western European countries, and the socialist parties and governments overall, viewed the Portuguese crisis as a crucial text of Europe's ability to offer an inclusive model of democracy and modernization. The main argument of the article is that such model was very popular in the least developed areas of Europe, as the electorate of Portugal made abundantly clear, and could offer a stabilizing alternative to the now discredited logics and partitions of the Cold War.