Quantificational Logic and Empty Names

Andrew Bacon

2013 · 58 citations · 16 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The classical theory of quantification faces difficulties with contingent existence and empty names, producing false English sentences that translate to theorems and lacking a straightforward treatment of empty names. The paper proposes a modal metaphysics based on a weakened classical logic to avoid these objections.

Abstract

© 2013, Philosophers’ Imprint This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License The classical theory of quantification is subject to a number of difficulties relating to contingent existence and to the treatment of both empty and non-empty names. In this paper I propose and defend a modal metaphysics, couched in a weakening of classical logic, that avoids these objections. It is well known that classical quantification theory does not provide a straightforward treatment of empty names. According to the simplest way of translating between English and first-order logic there are false sentences of English which translate to theorems of first-order logic. For a given first-order language, L, classical quantification theory proves every instance of the schema

References

16