Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution against Trojan-Horse Attack

Abstract

Silicon photonics offers a stable, miniaturized platform for quantum key distribution (QKD). As such, the chip-based system is vital for a wider adoption of QKD in the near future. However, the practical security issues presented in this alternative platform have not been fully studied. Here, we theoretically and experimentally evaluate the security of a chip-based QKD system under a powerful source attack, namely, Trojan-horse attack. We analyze the finite-key security of two prominent QKD protocols---BB84 and measurement-device-independent QKD---with the information leakage from both the polarization modulator and the intensity modulator integrated on a silicon photonic chip. Furthermore, we prove that our chip-based measurement-device-independent QKD system is feasibly resistant to the Trojan-horse attack by adding 232-dB isolation to the chip. In this sense, our work provides a guideline for the secure implementation of a leaky transmitter chip in the QKD system.