BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsBankingFinancial EconomicsMacroeconomicsCredit MarketsCredit RiskFinancial CrisesFinancial DistressFinancial StabilityMoral HazardCredit BubblesDynamic Moral HazardEconomic RecessionsExogenous ShocksInterbank MarketsMoral Hazard Analysis
Banking crises are rare events that break out in the midst of credit intensive booms and bring about particularly deep and long–lasting recessions. This paper attempts to explain these phenomena within a textbook DSGE model that features a non–trivial banking sector. In the model, banks are heterogeneous with respect to their intermediation skills, which gives rise to an interbank market. Moral hazard and asymmetric information in this market may lead to sudden interbank market freezes, banking crises, credit crunches and, ultimately, severe recessions. The model can potentially generate various types of banking crises. But the typical crisis breaks out endogenously, during a credit boom generated by a sequence of small positive supply shocks; it does not result from a large negative exogenous shock. Simulations of a calibrated version of the model indicate that it can mimic the main dynamic patterns of banking crises.
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Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss · American Economic Review · 1981 · 12.9K citations · Full text
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Oliver Hart · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1995 · 2.9K citations
Business, Contract Law, Economics +12