REPUTATION IN AN INTERNET AUCTION MARKET

Cynthia G. McDonald, V. Carlos Slawson

Economic Inquiry · 2002 · 262 citations · 17 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The study examines how varying anonymity levels among participants lower asymmetric information costs in an electronic auction market by employing a quantifiable reputation measure. Empirical results show that buyers use reputation to price counterparty risk, that high‑reputation sellers signal desirable traits such as accurate descriptions and efficient delivery, and that investing in reputation is economically incentivized, though some imperfections remain.

Abstract

We investigate how market participants possessing varying degrees of anonymity reduce asymmetric information costs in an electronic auction market using a quantifiable measure of reputation. The data suggest that purchasers in this self‐enforcing market use reputation to price information asymmetries associated with counterparty risks. The results provide direct empirical evidence of an economic incentive for investing in reputation. The continually observable feedback of participants indicates that high seller reputation signals preferred traits, including advertised service accuracy, product description accuracy, delivery efficiency, and posttransaction communication. Despite some imperfections, the reputation measure represents clear differences in expected performance between high‐reputation and low‐reputation counterparties.

References

17