Review of Financial Studies · 2014 · 56 citations · 31 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsBank RegulationBankingFinancial EconomicsBank GovernanceBank LiquidationBanking RegulationCommercial BankingFinancial CrisesTransaction Cost EconomicsBank Failure ManagementBank Resolution CostsBank Risk-taking Incentives
We estimate a dynamic model of the decision to close a troubled bank. Regulators trade off an aversion to closing banks against the risk that allowing a bank to continue will raise the eventual costs to the deposit insurance fund. Using a conditional choice probability approach, we estimate the costs associated with closing banks, both in direct costs to the insurance fund and in other costs perceived by regulators, either social or personal. We find that delayed closures were driven by a desire to defer costs, an aversion to closing the largest and smallest troubled banks, and political influence.
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Douglas W. Diamond, Philip H. Dybvig · Journal of Political Economy · 1983 · 9.4K citations · Full text
Large sample estimation and hypothesis testing
Whitney K. Newey, Daniel McFadden · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1986 · 2.2K citations
Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher
John Rust · Econometrica · 1987 · 1.8K citations