Journal of Political Economy · 2001 · 2K citations · 26 references
BusinessFinanceBankingCapital StructureFinancial EconomicsFinancial DistressFinancial RiskLiquidityLiquidity ManagementLiquidity RiskRelationship BankingBanking FragilityBanking System FragilityLender RelationshipsLiquidity PremiaLiquidity Regulation Of BanksLiquidity Risk In BankingStabilization
Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, if the relationship lender needs funds before the loan matures, she may demand to liquidate early, or require a return premium, when she lends directly. Borrowers also risk losing funding. The costs of illiquidity are avoided if the relationship lender is a bank with a fragile capital structure, subject to runs. Fragility commits banks to creating liquidity, enabling depositors to withdraw when needed, while buffering borrowers from depositors' liquidity needs. Stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, narrow banking, and suspension of convertibility, may reduce liquidity creation.
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Douglas W. Diamond, Philip H. Dybvig · Journal of Political Economy · 1983 · 9.4K citations · Full text
Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
Douglas W. Diamond · The Review of Economic Studies · 1984 · 8.5K citations
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Oliver Hart · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1995 · 2.9K citations
Business, Contract Law, Economics +12