RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2002 · 38 citations · 0 references
Open access
Social SciencesEconomicsSociologyCollective BargainingHousehold DemographyLabor EconomicsFamily EconomicsHousehold EconomicsHousehold EconomyHousehold OrganizationHousehold StructureLaborGendered Household RolesGendered Intra-household BargainingGendered Labor RelationsHousehold Bargaining PowerHousehold Decision-making PowerHousehold LabourHousehold Power DynamicsIntra-household Dynamics
The authors use the collective model of \n the household and show, theoretically, that as the \n woman's power rises, child labor will initially fall, \n but beyond a point it will tend to rise again. A household \n with a balanced power structure between the husband and the \n wife is least likely to send its children to work. An \n empirical test of this relationship using data from Nepal \n strongly corroborates the theoretical hypothesis.