National Bureau of Economic Research · 1997 · 75 citations · 0 references
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Public AffairsEconomicsSocial PolicyLabor EconomicsPension LawSocial InsuranceEarly Retirement BenefitsPension PolicyRetirement PolicyRetirement Security PolicySocial Security PaymentsSocial Security PolicyEmployee Retirement Income SecurityLabor Supply IncentivesLow WagesMinimum PensionsPublic Pension PolicyRetirementRetirement BehaviorRetirement Saving Decisions
The Spanish Social Security system’s main public pension scheme (RGSS) covers most private employees, offers modest average pensions but large minimum pensions to low‑wage or short‑history workers, while higher earners with full histories receive weak gains for retiring after age 60. The study aims to analyze the incentives to early retirement offered by the Spanish Social Security system. The authors describe the system’s historical evolution and organization, then compute the early‑retirement incentives for different types of workers. Spanish SS legislation generates strong incentives to retire early, leading workers to do so and explaining the rise in early retirees during the 1990s, with pension‑induced incentives affecting labor supply.
We describe the historical evolution the Spanish Social Security system and its current organization. Our attention concentrates on the main public pension scheme for private employees in the manufacturing and service sector (RGSS) which covers by far the largest majority Spanish workers. After describing the way in which pension and retirement decisions are regulated by this system, we try to compute the incentives to early retirement it provides to different kinds individuals. We show that the Spanish SS legislation generates strong incentives to retire early and that Spanish workers tend to do so. In particular, our findings support the idea that pensions-induced incentives matter for the labor supply behavior of Spanish workers. While the Spanish system does not pay a particularly generous average pension relative to GDP per-capita, its generosity' concentrates on providing large minimum pensions to individuals with below average working histories and/or low wages. At the same time, the pension system provides workers earning average or above average salaries and with complete working histories with relatively weak financial gains from not retiring after the age 60. The combination these features the Spanish legislation seems to account well for the observed increase in the percentage early retirees among Spanish pensioners during the nineties.