IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems · 2021 · 13 citations · 18 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityFault-tolerant ComputingFault-tolerant SystemsAuthenticated EncryptionCollision DetectionCryptographic ComplexityElliptic Curve CryptographyFault Injection AttacksHardware Fault ToleranceAdvanced Encryption StandardChosen-plaintext AttacksComplexityEncryptionFault AnalysisFault Model AnalysisFault-based AttacksTransient Fault Injection
A transient fault-based collision attack always requires to inject fault multiple times. We present the first attack that uses collision information caused by a persistent fault in the substitution box (S-box) to recover the entire 128-bit key of the advanced encryption standard (AES). Moreover, a relatively relaxed fault model is required; i.e., the attacker does not know any information about the position, the length (i.e., the number of bytes), or the value of the injected fault. At most, 4096 chosen plaintexts are required for a persistent fault-based collision attack (PFCA), and the computational complexity is O(2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">23</sup> ) in the worst case in the single-byte fault setting. A filtering algorithm is presented in the multibyte fault setting, and we theoretically prove that the complexity can be reduced to O(2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">12</sup> ) in more than half of cases if the number of collision ciphertexts follows a uniform distribution. In addition, PFCAs against a software implementation of AES are simulated on a laptop, and the results show that the success probability of the attack either with online key searching or with offline key searching approaches 100%. In particular, more than 97% of all experiments output the right key with complexity O(2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">12</sup> ) in the multibyte fault setting. Therefore, the attack is more efficient in this scenario. Furthermore, the attack works on an AES implementation protected by Boolean masking. Finally, PFCAs against AES implementations separately protected by two widely used countermeasures-the inverse S-box and the parity-1 matrix-are performed. The experimental results illustrate that only a 10-round protection using the first method can completely defeat the attack.
18
Flipping bits in memory without accessing them
Yoongu Kim, Ross Daly, Jeremie Kim et al. · ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News · 2014 · 907 citations
Kris Tiri, Muhammad Akmal, Ingrid Verbauwhede · European Solid-State Circuits Conference · 2002 · 518 citations
Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering +17
Fault Attacks on AES with Faulty Ciphertexts Only
Thomas Fuhr, Éliane Jaulmes, Victor Lomné et al. · 2013 · 165 citations