Synthese · 2020 · 23 citations · 39 references
Social SciencesEvolutionary BiologyEvolutionary TheoryGame TheoryMicroevolutionBehavioral Game TheoryEvolutionary DynamicsEvolutionary Game TheoryFitness Trade-offsNash EquilibriumSignaling GamesAmbiguity In Game TheoryAmbiguity In GamesContextual CuesGame-theoretic EvolutionSignaling Under Uncertainty
Abstract In Lewisean signaling games with common interests, perfect signaling strategies have been shown to be optimal in terms of communicative success and evolutionary fitness. However, in signaling game models that involve contextual cues, ambiguous signaling strategies can match up to or even outperform perfect signaling. For a minimalist example of such a context signaling game , I will show that three strategy types are expected to emerge under evolutionary dynamics: perfect signaling, partial ambiguity and full ambiguity. Moreover, I will show that partial ambiguity strategies are the most expected outcome and have the greatest basin of attraction among these three types when sender and receiver costs are arbitrarily small or similar. I will demonstrate that the evolutionary success of partial ambiguity is due to being risk dominant, which points to a better compatibility with other strategy types.
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Michael Spence · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1973 · 15.2K citations
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Social Sciences, Evolutionary Biology, Dynamical Systems +13