Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis

René M. Stulz

The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2010 · 513 citations · 29 references

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TL;DR

Credit default swaps, traded largely in the unregulated over‑the‑counter market, have been argued to have contributed to the credit crisis through counter‑party risk and speculative negative views of firms. The study argues that eliminating over‑the‑counter trading of credit default swaps could reduce social welfare, but stresses the need for further research to quantify the social gains and costs of derivatives. The author concludes that credit default swaps did not cause the crisis, that the OTC market functioned well during most of the first year, and that exchange trading offers both advantages and costs relative to OTC.

Abstract

Many observers have argued that credit default swaps contributed significantly to the credit crisis. Of particular concern to these observers are that credit default swaps trade in the largely unregulated over-the-counter market as bilateral contracts involving counter-party risk and that they facilitate speculation involving negative views of a firm's financial strength. Some observers have suggested that credit default swaps would not have made the crisis worse had they been traded on exchanges. I conclude that credit default swaps did not cause the dramatic events of the credit crisis, that the over-the-counter credit default swaps market worked well during much of the first year of the credit crisis, and that exchange trading has both advantages and costs compared to over-the-counter trading. Though I argue that eliminating over-the-counter trading of credit default swaps could reduce social welfare, I also recognize that much research is needed to understand better and quantify the social gains and costs of derivatives in general and credit default swaps in particular.

References

29