IEEE Transactions on Services Computing · 2019 · 32 citations · 17 references
ComputingCloud ComputingComputer ScienceAuction TheoryCloud EconomicsCloud InfrastructureCloud Resource ManagementCombinatorial AuctionsMulti-unit AuctionsResource ProvisioningResource SchedulingResource SharingCloud Computing ResourcesCloud FederationCloud Resource AllocationDouble Auction MarketsFederated CloudFederated ManagementMulti-unit Auction DesignMulti-unit Auction Mechanism Design
The growing market of cloud computing resulted in increased demand for cloud resources and it will become difficult for individual service providers (SPs) to fulfill all resource requests. That leads to a situation where two or more SPs may form a group (federation) and share the resources in order to fulfill the cloud users’ demand and gain economic advantage. Now, due to the formation of more than one federations by different cloud providers, it may be difficult for users to select a suitable federation who can deliver cloud services at a fair price. In this context, it is necessary to have a framework that will efficiently allocate resources of cloud federations to the users at a fair price and stop market manipulation. In this article, we propose a multi-unit double auction mechanism called TARA ( <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">T</b> ruthful Double <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">A</b> uction for <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">R</b> esource <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">A</b> llocation) that can be used to efficiently choose cloud federations for users from which they can get resources. Here, we consider a multi-seller and multi-buyer double auction mechanism for heterogeneous resources, where every buyer submits their bids and every seller places their ask (the price of a resource that is offered by a federation). TARA achieves some important properties like truthfulness (also known as incentive compatibility), individual rationality and budget balance for both buyers and sellers. TARA is also computationally efficient and posses high system efficiency. The simulation results also show that total utility of buyer is more than some existing double auction mechanisms.
17
Theodore Groves · Econometrica · 1973 · 3.3K citations
Management, Organization Studies, Organizational Behavior +17
Multipart pricing of public goods
Edward H. Clarke · Public Choice · 1971 · 3.3K citations
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders
William Vickrey · The Journal of Finance · 1961 · 1.9K citations
A dominant strategy double auction
R. Preston McAfee · Journal of Economic Theory · 1992 · 620 citations
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +11