The RAND Journal of Economics · 2019 · 12 citations · 16 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsAgency TheoryDecision TheoryInformation TheoryAsymmetric InformationInformation AsymmetryInformation Asymmetry In MarketsInformation ControlInformation EconomicsInformation RevelationBargaining With Asymmetric InformationEfficiency With Incomplete InformationEx Ante IncentivesInformation Asymmetry EffectsInformation ConstraintsInformation CostsInformation Structure DesignLearning Under Asymmetric Information
Abstract We study the use of information control to mitigate hold‐up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency , which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold‐up risks.
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