IMF Working Paper · 2010 · 83 citations · 11 references
BusinessEconomicsBank RegulationBankingFinancial EconomicsBanking RegulationCapital ControlsCommercial BankingCross-border LendingInternational BankingCross-border Asset TransfersCross-border Bank LendingCross-border Banking FlowsCross-border Capital StructureExcess ProfitsParent-subsidiary RelationshipsRing-fenced CapitalSystemic Capital Buffers
This paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.
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Debt Enforcement around the World
Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh et al. · Journal of Political Economy · 2008 · 947 citations
Business, Finance, Contract Theory +16