Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2019 · 93 citations · 50 references
Social SciencesOrganization StudiesCollective BehaviorGroup DynamicsKnowledge SharingCooperative BehaviorEvolution Of CooperationGroup CoordinationSocial CooperationSocial ExchangeCoordinated InteractionCoordinationCoordination In Small GroupsEveryday SocialityExchange PartnershipsMutual Benefit In Partnerships
People often coordinate for mutual gain, such as keeping to opposite sides of a stairway, dubbing an object or place with a name, or assembling en masse to protest a regime. Because successful coordination requires complementary choices, these opportunities raise the puzzle of how people attain the common knowledge that facilitates coordination, in which a person knows X, knows that the other knows X, knows that the other knows that he knows, ad infinitum. We show that people are highly sensitive to the distinction between common knowledge and mere private or shared knowledge, and that they deploy this distinction strategically in diverse social situations that have the structure of coordination games, including market cooperation, innuendo, bystander intervention, attributions of charitability, self-conscious emotions, and moral condemnation.
50
Convention: A Philosophical Study.
J. E. Llewelyn, David K. Lewis · The Philosophical Quarterly · 1970 · 3.2K citations
Stephen Thielke · Psychiatric Services · 2004 · 3.1K citations
Robert J. Aumann · The Annals of Statistics · 1976 · 2.5K citations