ArXiv.org · 2007 · 66 citations · 11 references
Social SciencesEconomicsCollective BargainingGame TheoryGroup DynamicsCoalition BuildingCoalition FormationCooperative Game TheoryCoordination GamesNash EquilibriumCoalition DynamicsCoalition Formation RulesCoalition TheoryMergeMerge OperationsNoncooperative Coalition Formation
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
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Equilibrium Binding Agreements
Debraj Ray, Rajiv Vohra · Journal of Economic Theory · 1997 · 437 citations · Full text
Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
Sang‐Seung Yi · Games and Economic Behavior · 1997 · 434 citations · Full text