2019 · 48 citations · 51 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityHardware SecurityOperating SystemsEmbedded SecurityMicroarchitectural SecurityOperating System SecuritySide-channel AnalysisSide-channel AttacksSystem SecurityExecution EnvironmentExecution Environment IsolationExecution Unit Contention AttacksHardware Isolation MechanismsMicroarchitectural Side-channel AttacksOperating System ArchitectureTrusted Execution Environment SecurityTrusted Execution Environments
The popularity of hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) has recently skyrocketed with the introduction of Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX). In SGX, the user process is protected from supervisor software, such as the operating system, through an isolated execution environment called an enclave. Despite the isolation guarantees provided by TEEs, numerous microarchitectural side channel attacks have been demonstrated that bypass their defense mechanisms. But, not all hope is lost for defenders: many modern fine-grain, high-resolution side channels---e.g., execution unit port contention---introduce large amounts of noise, complicating the adversary's task to reliably extract secrets.
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Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical
Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge et al. · 2015 · 1K citations · Full text
Victor Costan, Srinivas Devadas · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · 2016 · 753 citations