If You Do Not Care About It, Sell It: Trading Location Privacy in Mobile Crowd Sensing

Abstract

Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) is a technique where sensing tasks are outsourced to a crowd of mobile users. Since most of sensing tasks are location-dependent, workers are required to embed their locations into sensing reports, which incurs location privacy vulnerabilities. Realizing that workers perceive their location privacy differently, in this work we construct an auction-based trading market, facilitating location privacy trading between workers and the platform. Each worker can decide how much location privacy to disclose to the platform based on its own location privacy leakage budget $\xi$. The higher $\xi$ is, the less secrecy its reported location preserves. As a result, it receives higher payment from the platform as a compensation to its privacy loss. Besides, our mechanism enables the platform to select a suitable set of winning workers to achieve desirable service accuracy. For this purpose, a heuristic algorithm is devised, with polynomial-time complexity and bounded optimality gap. As formally proved in this manuscript, our proposed mechanism guarantees a series of nice properties, including $\xi$-privacy, $(\alpha,\beta)$accuracy, and budget feasibility.