Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties

Darrell Duffie

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2014 · 33 citations · 3 references

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TL;DR

A central counterparty reduces counterparty default risk by interposing as buyer and seller, but if it fails it may enter bankruptcy or an administrative failure resolution process. The chapter reviews alternative insolvency and failure resolution regimes for CCPs, focusing on loss allocation, continuity of clearing services, and when to override the default management process. The author discusses adapting failure resolution approaches used for other systemically important financial institutions to CCPs.

Abstract

A central counterparty (CCP) is a financial market utility that lowers counterparty default risk on specified financial contracts by acting as a buyer to every seller, and as a seller to every buyer. When at risk of failure, a CCP could be forced into a normal insolvency process such as bankruptcy, or an administrative failure resolution process. This chapter reviews some alternative approaches to the design of insolvency and failure resolution regimes for CCPs. I focus on the allocation of losses and the question of whether and how to provide for continuity of clearing services. I discuss how one might adapt to CCPs some of the failure resolution approaches currently being designed for other forms of systemically important financial institutions. A key policy question is when to interrupt a contractually based CCP default management process with an overriding failure resolution process.

References

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