2018 · 42 citations · 9 references
ComputingComputer ScienceSystems EngineeringComputer SecuritySecure Software DevelopmentSecurity ArchitecturePrivacy Threat ModelingSecure System DesignSecurity ManagementSoftware Security EngineeringSystem SecurityThreat ModelingContinuous Threat ModelingPrivacy ArchitecturePrivacy-preserving System DesignSecurity Risk AnalysisSoftware Architecture Threat AnalysisSoftware Development MethodologyTechnical DebtTechnical Debt Assessment
Secure and privacy‑preserving software requires continuous consideration, yet current threat modeling is often a one‑time, outdated exercise that creates technical debt by missing new issues and repeating resolved ones. SPARTA is a prototype that captures design decisions in a DFD abstraction, continuously elicits threats, and performs risk analysis to prioritize security and privacy work. It tracks how design decisions affect threats over time, enabling assessment of progress and comparison of alternatives based on past and current decisions. This continuous assessment demonstrates that progress can be measured and alternatives compared, accounting for the system’s evolving design choices.
The development of secure and privacy-preserving software systems entails the continuous consideration of the security and privacy aspects of the system under development. While contemporary software development practices do support such a continuous approach towards software development, existing threat modeling activities are commonly executed as single-shot efforts leading to a single, historic, and quickly obsolete view on the security and privacy of the system. This disconnect leads to undetected new issues and wasted efforts on already resolved problems, effectively accruing technical debt. The presented SPARTA prototype facilitates the consideration of security and privacy by providing support for: (i) capturing security and privacy design decisions in a DFD-based architectural abstraction, (ii) continuous threat elicitation on this knowledge-enriched abstraction, and (iii) risk analysis of the elicited threats for prioritizing security and privacy efforts. By capturing and continuously assessing the impact of security and privacy design decisions on the elicited threats, the progress towards securing the system can be assessed and alternatives can be compared, taking into account past and present design decisions.
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Experiences Threat Modeling at Microsoft.
Adam Shostack · 2008 · 126 citations
Demystifying the Threat-Modeling Process
Peter Torr · IEEE Security & Privacy · 2005 · 116 citations
Computing, Computer Science, Design +16
Privacy Threats in Software Architectures
Kim Wuyts · 2015 · 41 citations
Computing, Computer Science, Design +13